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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
least recognized that such an ambit exists, and that the "one man,
one vote" principle should not venture outside of it lest the theo-
retical tail end up wagging the functional dog.
RICHARD J. BRYAN
Constitutional Law-Miranda v. Arizona and the
Fourth Amendment
An interesting new dimension of Miranda v. Arizona' was pre-
sented in two recent cases, State v. Forney2 and State v. McCarty.8
The defendants in these cases argued for application of Miranda's
requirements4 concerning confessions to those rights guaranteed by
the fourth amendment.5 Despite the judiciary's contemporary ten-
dency to emphasize the necessity of protecting the individual's con-
stitutional rights, neither court would apply the Miranda test be-
cause Miranda dealt specifically with only the fifth and sixth amend-
ments.
In Forney the defendant willingly went to the police station to
answer questions after being apprehended in his car as a suspect
for burglary. When the defendant was asked by an officer at the
station if the officer could look in his car, the defendant agreed.
Later, in testimony, the defendant described the situation: "Ah Well,
they asked me if I was-they could search my car, and I said, 'Yeah,
go ahead.' I couldn't stop them." 6 As a result of the search, a bag
'384 U.S. 436 (1966).2150 N.W.2d 915 (Neb. 1967).
'427 P.2d 616 (Ore. 1967).
As for procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of
silence . . . the following measures are required. Prior to any ques-
tioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
384 U.S. at 444.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Co1sT. amend. IV. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 385 U.S. 523.
(1967).
150 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Neb. 1967).
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and loaded revolver were found and these articles were held to be
admissible evidence by the Supreme Court of Nebraska.'
In McCarty the defendant and a companion were apprehended
as suspects for robbery. After being taken to the police station,
the defendant signed a written consent to a search of the living
quarters over the tavern where he had been apprehended. This
search yielded evidence which was significant in the defendant's
conviction of robbery.'
The defendants in Forney and McCarty were asked to waive
their constitutional rights under the fourth amendment. Explana-
tion of their rights was not offered nor was counsel suggested or
offered to help them. For all practical purposes, the defendants
waived rights of which they were not clearly aware; and the aban-
donment of these rights resulted in evidence detrimental to their
cases. It is in this context that the defendants argued that a valid
consent-search should be subject to the same or similar requirements
established in Miranda for confessions.9
In both McCarty and Forney the defendants' arguments were
rejected by the state supreme courts for substantially the same rea-
sons. The court in McCarty said:
Miranda deals only with the compulsory self-incrimination
barred by the Fifth Amendment, not with the unreasonable
search and seizure proscribed by the Fourth Amendment. There
is an obvious distinction between the purposes to be served by
these two historic sections of the Bill of Rights. The Fifth
Amendment prohibits the odious practice of compelling a man
to convict himself; the Fourth guards the sanctity of his home
and possessions as those terms have been judicially interpreted.
An indispensable element of compulsory self-incrimination is
some degree of compulsion. The essential component of an
unreasonable search and seizure is some sort of unreasonable-
ness.1
0
An attempt to separate completely the purposes of the fourth and
fifth amendments is also found in Forney when the court states that
71d. at 916-18.
8427 P.2d 616, 619 (Ore. 1967).
9 Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police
have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous
search of the persons of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of
or implements used to commit the crime.
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
427 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Ore. 1967).
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Miranda in that jurisdiction will pertain "only to the issue tried
therein, and will not be extended by analogy to cover the Fourth
Amendment .... "I'
Whatever may have been the limited intention of the framers
of the fourth and fifth amendments, case history illustrates that the
scope of the two amendments has been undeniably expanded.1 2 The
Supreme Court has emphasized that "the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments run almost into each other,"13 that they are "supplementing
phases of the same constitutional purpose-to maintain inviolate
large areas of personal privacy,"14 and that the "values protected by
the Fourth Amendment thus substantially overlap those the Fifth
Amendment helps to protect." 5 Any other view which attempts to
separate the two amendments in regard to limited and outdated ob-
jectives seems wholly anachronistic and tends to destroy the vitality
of the Constitution.
The court in McCarty emphasized that the key word in the fifth
amendment is "compulsion" while the crucial word in the fourth is
"unreasonableness." The court, however, apparently overlooked the
Supreme Court's holding in Boyd v. United States that the two
amendments "throw great light on each other."'" In that case the
Court recognized that the search and seizure of evidence within an
accused's possession might well violate the self-incrimination clause
of the fifth amendment. If the possibility of self-incrimination is
11150 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Neb. 1967). The court added:
The trial court sustained the motion to suppress on the theory
that in order for a consent to be voluntary it was necessary that the
defendant be first advised that he need not submit to a search, and that
if he does consent, the fruits of the search may be used as evidence
against him. To reach this result the trial court held that Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, which involved the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States, by analogy was appli-
cable to search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States.
Id. at 917.
2 See Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Antendment
to the United States Constitution, 55 JonNs HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES
IN HxSTORICA. AND POLITICAL SrUDIES 211, 261-88 (1937). See also
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Murphy Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924);
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
1" Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
"' Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1944).
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
16 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
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present, said the Court, then the search itself is unreasonable."
Thus, compulsion and unreasonableness can rarely, if ever, be
separated.
As can be seen from Boyd and other cited cases, the fourth and
fifth amendments protect inter-related zones of privacy." Both
Forney and McCarty appear to be relying on an insecure basis in
maintaining that the fourth amendment applies only to the security
of one's possessions and does not overlap the area of privacy guaran-
teed by the fifth. Not only is the fifth amendment incorporated into
the fourth by the provision that people are to be "secure in their
persons," but the protection offered by the fourth is also incorpo-
rated into the fifth. 9 A consent-search necessarily includes a
degree of communication or testimony. One who consents to a
search is, for all practical purposes, saying either "Yes, I am guilty"
or "No, I am not guilty."2 The only remaining alternative is that
the individual's consent is the product of hope or fear, both of which
have been held to be invalid consents under the two amendments.2 '
Thus, it seems unsatisfactory to deny application of the Miranda
test for the reason that the fourth and fifth amendments have sepa-
rate purposes. 22  Indeed, the two amendments have been insepa-
"See 1967 DuxE L.J. 366.
8 See the dissenting opinion of Douglas, J. in Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 778-79 (1966), where he says:
The Fifth Amendment marks 'a zone of privacy' which the Gov-
ernment may not force a person to surrender . . . . Likewise the
Fourth Amendment recognizes that right when it guarantees the
right of the people to be secure "in their persons."
10 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1966) where the Court
says that "the privilege [against self-incrimination] was elevated to consti-
tutional status and has always been 'as broad as the mischief against which
it seeks to guard.'" See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 See 67 CoLtJm. L. REv. 130, 135 n.29 (1967). Also see Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966) in which the Court says that "no dis-
tinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged
to be merely 'exculpatory.'"
21 There is no doubt but that the defendant was influenced by his
situation, and, when all the surrounding circumstances are considered
in their true relations, not only is the claim that the consent was
voluntary overthrown, but the impression is irresistibly produced that
it must necessarily have been the result of either hope or fear, or both
operating on the mind.
United States v. Baldocci, 42 F.2d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 1930). See also
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) and Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10 (1948).
'See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921):
The effect of the decisions cited [Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886), Weeks v. United States, 245 U.S. 618 (1914), and Silver-
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rably woven together both by their own language and by the
Supreme Court's interpretations. To separate them is to enter upon
an absurdity not unlike trying to separate the concept of freedom
into life without liberty, or liberty without the pursuit of happiness.
Regardless of their views toward the fourth and fifth amend-
ments, the courts in Forney and McCarty expressed one more rea-
son why they would not apply Miranda to the fourth amendment.
In the words of the Nebraska Supreme Court, "So far as I have
been able to determine, the United States Supreme Court has not
applied the Miranda test to searches and seizures. Until it does so,
if it ever does, we should not further shackle law enforcement."23
This belief is reiterated in McCarty.24 The courts' reasoning, how-
ever, flies in the face of Miranda itself. Searching for precedent to
justify a decision cannot by any means insure justice. In Miranda,
the Supreme Court emphasized the fact that "our contemplation
cannot be only of what has been but of what may be,"' 2' and it
encouraged courts to find new solutions to guarantee justice. 20
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) concerning
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments] is: that such rights are declared
to be indispensable to the "full enjoyment of personal security, per-
sonal liberty, and private property;" that they are to be regarded as
of the very essence of constitutional liberty; and that the guaranty
of them is as important and is imperative as are the guaranties of the
other fundamental rights of the individual citizen,-the right, to trial
by jury, to the writ of habeas corpus and to due process of law. It
has been repeatedly decided that these Amendments should receive a
liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or
'gradual depreciation' of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible
practice of courts or by well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous
executive officers.
2" State v. Forney, 150 N.W.2d 915, 917-18 (Neb. 1967). But see
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62-63 (1967) where the Court said:
In any event we cannot forgive the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment in the name of law enforcement. This is no formality
that we require today but a fundamental rule that has long been
recognized as basic to the privacy of every home in America. While
'the requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not inflexible, or
obtusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of law enforcement,' ...
it is not asking too much that officers be required to comply with the
basic command of the Fourth Amendment before the innermost se-
crets of one's home or office are invaded.
2'427 P.2d 616, 619 (Ore. 1967).
25384 U.S. 436, 443 (1966). The Supreme Court went on to say:
Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of
application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general
principles would have little value and be converted by precedent into
impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be
loss in reality.26 Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straightjacket
[Vol. 46
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Moreover, although the two state courts were reluctant to apply
the Miranda test to searches and seizures, a lower federal court did
not hesitate to apply requirements similar to those of the Miranda
test to guarantee the rights secured by the fourth amendment. In
United States v. Blalock ,217 three F.B.I. agents encountered the de-
fendant in a hotel lobby. The defendant, who was suspected of
robbing a bank, was frisked by the agents after they had identified
themselves. Although they had no warrant, they accompanied the
defendant to his room. The defendant denied any knowledge of
the crime, but the entire party entered his room. When asked if
he would consent to a search of his room, the defendant replied that
he would not object. As a result of this consent-search, money from
the robbery was found and used as evidence at the defendant's trial.2"
In a well-reasoned opinion citing numerous other decisions, the
district court said that "rights given by the Constitution are too
fundamental and too precious for waiver lightly to be found." 9 An
effective waiver is present "only where there is 'an intentional re-
linquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'-3'
The district court maintained that where the government relies on
consent to validate a warrantless search, the consent must not only
be voluntary but also intelligent3 ' or knowing. 2 It, therefore, held
that a defendant who is not warned of his fourth amendment rights
cannot be said to have abandoned them. 3 In conclusion, the district
court emphasized that the requirements for waiver are the same for
both the fourth and fifth amendments:
which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have
this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue their
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our
criminal laws.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
27 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
28 Id. at 268-269.
. Id. at 269. See also Pennsylvania ex rel. Whiting v. Cavell, 244 F.
Supp. 560, 567 (M.D. Pa. 1965).
"United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See
also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
31 Obviously, the requirement of an 'intelligent' consent implies that
the subject of the search must have been aware of his rights, for an
intelligent consent can only embrace the waiver of a 'known right.'
255 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See United States ex ret. Mancini
v. Rundle, 337 F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1964); Walker v. Peppersack, 316 F.2d
119 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960).
2 United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
" See also United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966).
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The agents here properly warned defendant of his right to
counsel and his right to remain silent, but they did not warn him
of his right to refuse a warrantless search. The Fourth Amend-
ment requires no less knowing a waiver than do the Fifth and
Sixth. The requirement of knowledge in each serves the same
purpose, i.e., to prevent the possibility that the ignorant may
surrender their rights more readily than the shrewd . . . . To
require law enforcement agents to advise the subjects of investi-
gation of their right to insist on a search warrant would impose
no great burden, nor would it unduly or unnecessarily impede
criminal investigation. 4
Not only is the reasoning behind the decisions questionable in
Forney and McCarty, but justice itself demands that a Miranda-
type test or an objective standard be applied to guarantee the rights
secured by the fourth amendment. A warning-similar to the one
imposed by Miranda-has been suggested by a student for dealing
with warrantless searches:
You have a right to refuse to allow me to search your home,
and if you decide to refuse, I will respect your refusal. If you
do decide to let me search, you won't be able to change your
mind later on, and during the search I'll be able to look in
places and take things which I couldn't even if I could get a
search warrant. You have a right to a lawyer before you decide,
and if you can't afford a lawyer we will get you one and you
won't have to pay for him. There are many different laws which
are designed to protect you from my searching, but they are
too complicated for me to explain or for you to understand, so
if you think you would like to take advantage of this very im-
portant information, you will need a lawyer to help you before
you tell me I can search.35
This type of warning serves several important purposes. In the
first place, it informs the individual of his rights. The ignorant
and the well-informed are brought to a less unequal position, espe-
cially when one knows he may have an attorney present.8" Authori-
ties are less able to exploit the deprived or ill-equipped. Moreover,
the warning impresses the consequences of his decision upon the
individual and makes him more reluctant to abandon his constitu-
255 F. Supp. 268, 269-70 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
"67 COLUm. L. REv. 130, 158 (1967).
Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful
alike is an age-old problem. People have never ceased to hope and
strive to move closer to that goal.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956). See also Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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tional rights. Such an objective standard is held in high regard by
the Supreme Court, as indicated by Miranda.3 7 Finally, because of
the warning's content and its likely effect upon the individual, the
warning requirement would encourage authorities to seek the ju-
dicially preferred search warrant.8  The skeptical practice of con-
ducting a warrantless search in reliance upon the individual's un-
informed consent would grow increasingly rare.
It seems fair to say that if courts adopt the Forney-McCarty
position, justice will suffer because fourth amendment rights will
be protected by subjective good faith alone. And, as the Supreme
Court said in Beck v. Ohio:
If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections
of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would
be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," only
in the discretion of the police.89
D. S. DUNKLE
Constitutional Law-Racial Discrimination-Expansion of
State Action
Since the Civil Rights Cases' the Supreme Court has held that
the fourteenth amendment prohibits "state action" and not purely
private action. Subsequent decisions have greatly expanded the
reach of "state action." Indeed the expansion has been so great
that commentators have suggested that the search for "state action"
is a "misleading search,"'2 that some sort of state action can always
be found, and that the Supreme Court should be using a different
mode of analysis.'
' 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966).
"" See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1956); Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960) ; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) ; Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452
(1932).
30379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
'See Horwitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957).
'St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State
Action and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MicE. L. RaV. 993 (1961) ;
Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. IEv. 3 (1961) ; Williams,
Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. REv. 347 (1963). Williams suggests
that the test should be whether the private group has so moved into the
area of public concern that the public's interest in eliminating the particular
19671
